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The gruesome attacks of 11 September 2001 signalled a powerful paradigm shift in international politics: governments previously accustomed to military menaces were now being increasingly threatened by independent, non-state actors. Consequently, a plethora of literature emerged, looking to better understand the nature of these actors. An aspect that has attracted substantial interest is the inter-relation between terrorism and organised crime (OC). This paper aims to answer the question as to whether, for the purpose of controlling and mitigating the threat they pose to society, there is meaning in differentiating between terrorist organisations (TOs) and organised crime groups (OCGs).

The first section of the paper will provide an account of the various kinds of threats posed by OCGs and TOs. The subsequent section will question whether it is possible, in today’s globalised era, to distinguish between these two actors, while the last sections will ask if such a differentiation is desirable.

OCGs and TOs display a clear divergence: the former’s motivation is financial while the latter’s political. With the end of the Cold War, however, each type of organisation has been building up the capabilities of the other, helped by the force of global networks. As such, these two actors now exist within the same body – a continuum – that renders their separation difficult. As to the question of desirability, the separation of the two phenomena has often led to the adoption of highly disproportionate militarised and securitised measures, resulting in a dangerous blending of law enforcement and security service methodology.

Many have argued for the separation of the “terrorist” from the “criminal”, on the grounds that the former is particularly heinous and deserving of more severe measures. Others have studied the evolution of these two phenomena to understand whether the lines separating them have been blurring and the extent to which this affects law-enforcement. This paper goes beyond notions of feasibility and poses the following question: has the traditional separation of these phenomena led to a desirable regime?

This paper aims to look at the case of Italy, which clearly stands out in its relationship with organised crime. The recognition that money is the “lifeblood” of OC has resulted in the implementation of what we can refer to as the anti-money laundering (AML) regime, which backs the systematic targeting of mafia assets and the application of severe obstacles to the concealment of dirty money through increased financial surveillance. This paper discusses the financialisation of counter-mafia strategies, with the purpose of questioning the extent to which this system has been delivering what it promised.

The paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter looks at the relationship between Italian mafia and dirty money. The second chapter discusses the rationale and pillars of the AML regime. Finally, the last section examines and discusses recent evidence of the outcome of AML policies, by looking at figures as reported by relevant entities, such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), Europol, the Italian Ministry of Interior and the Direzione Investigativa Anti-Mafia (DIA).

Evidence suggests that financial surveillance, the first pillar of the AML regime, is much costlier than it is beneficial to society. Reporting of suspicions has rocketed in the past years, bringing very little change to yearly ML convictions, and being only marginally helpful in mafia-related investigations, confiscations and arrests. The confiscation of assets from mafia members, i.e. the second pillar of the AML regime, has proven to be effective in gaining control over large sums and goods. However, more research is needed around the question of confiscated asset-management and desirable re-investment opportunities.

As the AML regime gains in prominence internationally, it is of great value to assess its achievements so far. This is especially true of a country like Italy, which suffers from a long-standing mafia dominance. This paper represents a modest initial inquiry, which will hopefully be complemented by future research to come to an in-depth understanding of the value and limitations of an AML regime in fighting OC.